Reliable performance in complex systems is determined in part by the adequacy with which mental models of the system capture accurately the dimensions of system coupling and system complexity. Failure to register coupling and complexity leads the observer to intervene into an imagined technology that does not exist and to convert opportunities for error into actual errors. To decrease the frequency with which this conversion occurs, people can make their models more complex or the systems they monitor less complex. Neither type of change is as daunting as it may appear, and this is illustrated by an analysis of the mental model and system design associated with the invasion of Grenada.
Introduction
Human reliability is conventionally defined as &dquo;the probability that a person ( 1 ) correctly performs some system-required activity in a required time period (if time is a limiting factor) and (2) performs no extraneous activity that can degrade the system&dquo; (Miller and Swain, 1987, p. 221 ) . The probability of human error is often represented by the ratio of errors made to number of opportunities for error. As Roberts (this issue) has noted, the organizations studied by the Berkeley project are those where the denominator is large, the numerator small, and both numbers represent the potential for catastrophe. High reliability organizations strive to prevent an opportunity for error from becoming an occasion of error, especially when errors can enlarge in incomprehensible ways with inconceivable consequences. To accomplish this goal, high reliability organizations seem to pay more attention to the denominator (prevent op-portunities for error) than to the numerator (prevent opportunities for error from becoming occasions of error).
In this essay we take a closer look at the numerator. We argue that opportunities are more likely to be converted into errors when mental models of systems that are both complex and tightly coupled understate these two dimensions and thereby become decoupled from the actual state of the system. Thus, reliability can be improved when mental models represent these two dimensions more adequately or when the actual values on these two dimensions themselves become simpler and looser. Reliability is a joint product of the model and that which is modeled.
The argument will be developed in the following manner. First, we examine the unique constraints that are imposed at the micro level by systems that are tightly coupled and interactively complex (Perrow, 1984) , systems that we will call &dquo;complex&dquo; for convenience. We pay special attention to the fact that these systems contain continuous processes, permanent uncertainty and strong emotions. Second, we argue that continuous processes, permanent uncertainty and strong emotions affect the mental models that operators are able to form of complex systems. Third, we argue that mental models are. susceptible to disruption of a kind that is relatively unique to complex systems. We label these disruptions &dquo;rendition errors.&dquo; Fourth, it is argued that reliable performance within a tightly coupled complex system can occur when people work on the very same couplings and complexity that impose strain on their mental models in the first place. We illustrate this solution using the invasion of Grenada as an example.
Context created by complex systems
To understand more about how individuals, small groups and teams achieve reliable performance, we must first understand the context of constraints and opportunities they face. That context is largely implicit in the other articles in this issue, and three key qualities of that context need to be made explicit. Nuclear carriers, air traffic control systems and nuclear power generation all utilize technologies characterized by continuous processing that is subject to unexpected interruptions and strong emotions. Continuous processing tightens the couplings among system components. Unexpected interruptions and strong emotions add interactive complexity to these tightly coupled components.
Continuous processes in complex systems
Continuous processes in complex systems impose their own imperative, the reliability imperative. The (Adler, 1986, p. 20 (p. 388) .
For example, Buchanan and Bessant ( 1985 ) (Woods et al., 1987 (Woods et al., , p. 1741 (Woods et al., 1987 (Woods et al., , p. 1745 (Karasek, 1979; Sutton and Kahn, 1987 The significance of these demands is that they force people to develop mental models (e.g. Gentner and Stevens, 1983; Rouse and Morris, 1986) 
Matching models with systems in Grenada
Metcalf's experience in Grenada is relevant to our more general interest in reliable performance because he managed a continuous process that was subject to unexpected events (e.g. Cuban strength was seriously underestimated). The system itself generated repeated opportunities for error, both because it was interactively complex (e.g. activities of different armed services had to be coordinated using tourist maps because military maps did not exist for this area) and because it was tightly coupled (e.g. Rules of Engagement such as &dquo;minimize casualties&dquo; (p. 282) imposed constraints on the choice of options).
What is instructive is the way Metcalf worked within these constraints to make his mental model more complex and tightly coupled while he simultaneously worked to make the system he modeled less complex and more loosely coupled. These joint efforts decrease the chance that his mental model becomes decoupled from the system it is designed to model. As the probability of decoupling decreases, so too does the probability that an opportunity for error will become an actual error.
We look first at the dimension of complexity. Metcalf's earlier experience in Saigon gave him a rough model to start with in structuring his command and control system in Grenada. He had some idea what to expect, but perhaps even more important, he had some idea of how his expectations could be interrupted and micro-managed from afar. The Saigon experience, in short, increased the repertoire of skills and diagnoses Metcalf brought to the situation in Grenada. This increment is crucial because it has been suggested that capability affects perception (Jervis, 1976) . People will perceive those events which they believe they can do something about, and will neglect those for which they have no response. People with many skills can afford to notice more details because whatever they find, there is a good chance that they can do something about it. Thus a person's repertoire has a significant effect on how much of the situation is noticed. The larger the repertoire, the larger the set of goals among which one can choose, because increased perception is likely to reveal more leverage points in the situation. The point is that Metcalf's experience in Saigon increased the complexity of his mental models which in turn allowed him to simplify the actual system he built in Grenada. Both changes improve the match between the model and that which is modeled on the relevant dimension of complexity.
Other ways in which complexity is managed in Grenada include the use of face-to-face meetings (p. 289). Daft and Lengel ( 1984) (Scott, 1987, p. 236) .
While Metcalf leaned toward the latter solution, he also allowed the interactions among professionals to construct structures which then affected further interactions in the field, with a further effect on structure. Thus, structure is both an independent and dependent variable in Metcalf's design. He relies on complex performances rather than upon complex performers or complex structures. This solution is closer to the newer models of structuration in the organizational literature (e.g. Barley, 1986; Turner, 1988 ) (Henshel, 1987) . Metcalf also loosens the coupling between himself and his subordinates by telling them what to do but allowing them to determine how they will do it.
What is interesting about these efforts is that they loosen the couplings among system parts, but in doing so, they also reduce complexity. (Weick, 1987, pp. 124-126 Weick, 1979, Chapter 3) and those representations that preserve tight coupling (e.g. the representation portrays swift, large causal effects) are more likely to be useful.
Second, system design should not be treated as a given. To do so is to avoid testing the possibility that small material changes may have large effects (Weick, 1984 
